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NOTES
MOVING BEYOND “REASONABLE”:
CLARIFYING THE FTC’S USE OF ITS
UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY IN DATA
SECURITY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Timothy E. Deal*
Data security breaches, which compromise private consumer
information, seem to be an ever-increasing threat. To stem this tide, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has relied upon its authority to enforce
the prohibition against unfair business practices under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“section 5”) to hold companies
accountable when they fail to employ data security measures that could
prevent breaches. Specifically, the FTC brings enforcement actions when it
finds that companies have failed to implement “reasonable” data security
measures. However, companies and scholars argue that the FTC has not
provided adequate notice of which data security practices it considers
“reasonable” for the purposes of section 5.
This Note explains and critically analyzes several existing proposals that
seek to bring clarity to the FTC’s application of its unfairness authority in
the data security context and ultimately proposes a novel solution which
encourages the FTC explicitly to outline its minimum data security
requirements through nonlegislative rulemaking. This Note contends that
the FTC should incorporate a principle of proportionality in any rule to
ensure that companies know which data security measures they should
implement based on the relative sensitivity of the consumer data that they
retain. Additionally, this Note suggests that the FTC should incorporate a
safe harbor provision so that compliant companies know that, by following
the FTC’s guidelines, they will be immune from section 5 enforcement
actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the many attention-grabbing stories in the news over the summer
of 2015, perhaps the most scandalous involved the Ashley Madison data
security breach.1 Targeting a site known for its focus on facilitating
extramarital affairs, hackers stole users’ personal information and
1. See Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, a Dating Website, Says Hackers May Have
Data on Millions, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/
technology/hacker-attack-reported-on-ashley-madison-a-dating-service.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/E9VX-VU5X].
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threatened to release that information to the public unless the site was shut
down.2 The hackers ultimately followed through with their threat and
released 9.7 gigabytes of private information belonging to thirty-seven
million Ashley Madison users.3
While somewhat less sensational, another widely publicized data security
breach occurred over the holiday season of 2013.4 There, over 100 million
Target shoppers’ personal information, which included credit and debit card
numbers, was compromised.5 These incidents illustrate the increasing trend
of high-profile data security breaches.6
Against this background, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or “the
Commission”), the U.S. agency tasked with enforcing consumer protection
laws, has brought claims against companies that have allegedly failed to
protect consumer privacy.7 The FTC brings these claims under its authority
to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act’s (“the FTC Act”) section 5
(“section 5”), which prohibits “persons, partnerships, or corporations” from
engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”8
Within this legal authority, the FTC can bring claims under either or both
the “unfair” and “deceptive” prongs of section 5.9 Early in its effort to
bring the FTC Act to bear on companies that failed to protect online
privacy, the FTC brought claims exclusively under its “deception
2. See id. Notably, that information was purported to include the users’ real names and
any financial transactions they made via Ashley Madison. Id.
3. See Daniel Victor, The Ashley Madison Data Dump, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/technology/the-ashley-madison-data-dumpexplained.html [https://perma.cc/W3NL-WD3F]. The released information included Ashley
Madison users’ names, addresses, and phone numbers, along with the last four digits of their
credit card numbers. Id.
4. See Elizabeth A. Harris, After Data Breach, Target Plans to Issue More Secure
Chip-and-PIN Cards, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/
business/after-data-breach-target-replaces-its-head-of-technology.html [https://perma.cc/2T
7L-QM7J].
5. Id.
6. See Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data
Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 673
(2013) (noting that, in 2011 alone, there were “at least 855 data breaches affecting over 174
million data records . . . across the globe”). Indeed, even the U.S. government’s Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) suffered a major data breach in 2015, affecting over twentyone million people. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed
21.5 Million People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/
office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html [https://perma.cc/4BFVBRSQ]. Hackers were able to access and acquire OPM computer records, which contained
an enormous amount of sensitive personal information, including Social Security numbers
and fingerprints. Id.
7. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015). The
FTC also has brought general internet privacy-related actions against companies such as
Google, Facebook, and Twitter. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 602 (2014).
8. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
9. See generally A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative
and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008) [hereinafter Overview of
FTC Authority], https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://
perma.cc/UH6K-A5X5].
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authority.”10 However, in more recent years the FTC has increasingly
relied on its “unfairness authority” as well.11 For example, in 2012, the
FTC sued Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (“Wyndham”), a global
hospitality company, for violating section 5.12 The FTC alleged that
Wyndham had engaged in both “unfair” and “deceptive” practices, which
facilitated three data breaches in two years.13 Regarding Wyndham’s
alleged “unfair” practices, the FTC claimed that it had failed to take
“reasonable” steps to prevent data breaches.14
Wyndham argued that the FTC lacks the authority to pursue data security
claims under the unfairness prong of section 5.15 Although the Third
Circuit affirmed that the FTC does, in fact, have authority to regulate data
security in this context,16 the FTC’s criteria for “fairness” remains unclear
for companies because the FTC has yet to explain what practices it
considers to be “reasonable.”17 As a result, there are a number of
conflicting scholarly proposals promoting a data security enforcement
regime that better informs companies of the FTC’s minimum data security
requirements.18
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, this Note analyzes the merits
of these scholarly proposals. Then, this Note proposes a novel solution to
this issue that strives to maximize important societal goals: (1) the need
for better notice to regulated entities;19 (2) the FTC’s goal of robust
consumer protection;20 and (3) the FTC’s need for administrative
flexibility given the dynamic technological environment it regulates.21
Accordingly, Part I of this Note explores the development of the FTC’s
section 5 authority. Next, Part II addresses the application of the FTC’s
section 5 authority in the online privacy and data security context. Part III
10. See, e.g., Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security
Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 131
(2008); see also infra Part II.A.
11. See Scott, supra note 10, at 134.
12. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Files Complaint Against Wyndham
Hotels for Failure to Protect Consumers’ Personal Information (June 26, 2012), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/ftc-files-complaint-against-wyndhamhotels-failure-protect [https://perma.cc/R4X8-PJ6G].
13. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
14. See id. at 241.
15. See id. at 240.
16. See id. at 259.
17. In Wyndham, the Third Circuit held that the FTC provided constitutionally adequate
fair notice regarding its criteria for fair data security practices. See id. That does not mean,
however, that the FTC actually has provided adequate notice. See, e.g., Stegmaier &
Bartnick, supra note 6, at 706–07 (“Even if the FTC is deemed to have provided legally
required fair notice of required data-security practices under [s]ection 5, the FTC’s policy
has not likely been effectively communicated.”).
18. See discussion infra Part III.A.
19. See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 706.
20. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last
visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/EX3M-8H93].
21. See Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining
Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809,
852 (2011).
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lays out and assesses several scholarly proposals regarding how the FTC
can better provide regulated companies with proper notice of what it
considers to be “reasonable” data security requirements under its unfairness
authority. Finally, Part IV proposes a resolution that is geared toward
balancing adequate notice to companies, consumer protection, and
administrative flexibility.
I. THE FTC AND ITS AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 5:
AN OVERVIEW
Today, various companies and other entities store a vast amount of
personal information electronically.22 According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), data security breaches occur where there is
an “unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of sensitive
personal information.”23 A variety of methods can facilitate a data security
breach, such as theft or loss of equipment, hacking, unintentional disclosure
of personal information, and use of other inadequate data security
practices.24 The FTC has identified many inadequate data security practices
including lack of encryption, failure to implement customary security
practices, and the use of weak passwords.25 No matter the cause, data
security breaches can compromise individuals’ personally identifiable
information26 (PII).
Although information regarding the consequences of data security
breaches is limited,27 it is beyond question that they can lead to identity
theft,28 which constitutes a range of criminal activities and individual
injuries.29 Criminal activities include the unauthorized use of credit cards
or the opening of a fraudulent bank account.30 These crimes can result in
anything from the inconvenience of having to cancel a credit card to
substantial financial loss.31
To stem the tide of increasing data security breaches, the FTC has
stepped in to hold companies accountable where such breaches are

22. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, DATA BREACHES ARE
FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL
EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 1 (2007) (“[M]any different sectors and entities now maintain
electronic records containing vast amounts of personal information on virtually all American
consumers.”).
23. See id. at 2.
24. See Scott, supra note 10, at 144–45.
25. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 651–55 (listing twenty-six inadequate data
security practices gleaned from FTC complaints).
26. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 2. The GAO has defined
PII as “any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity . . . such as name, Social Security Number, driver’s license number, and mother’s
maiden name.” See id. at 2 n.2.
27. See id. at 21.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 2.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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avoidable.32 More specifically, where companies have failed to take
“reasonable” steps to prevent data breaches and protect consumer data, the
FTC has brought cases using its statutory authority under section 5 of the
FTC Act.33
To establish relevant background, Part I.A provides a brief introduction
of the FTC’s general authority under section 5. Then, Part I.B summarizes
the development of that authority.
A. An Overview of the FTC’s Authority Under Section 5
The FTC is the federal agency tasked with protecting consumers and
promoting competition.34 When it was initially created in 1914, Congress
gave the FTC the power to enforce section 5 of the FTC Act, which
included a prohibition against “unfair methods of competition in
commerce.”35 Accordingly, for the first two decades of its existence, the
FTC’s authority was limited to regulating antitrust issues.36
In 1938, Congress amended section 5 to include “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce.”37 As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
The amendment added the phrase “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”
to the section’s original ban on “unfair methods of competition” and thus
made it clear that Congress, through [section] 5, charged the FTC with
protecting consumers as well as competitors. The House Report on the
amendment summarized congressional thinking: “[T]his amendment
makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of
equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.”38

Thus, Congress has granted authority to the FTC to enforce the prohibition
against unfair or deceptive practices to better protect consumers.39
Congress also has granted the FTC enforcement authority under other
statutes, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act,40 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act,41 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.42 However,
32. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 588.
33. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
34. See id.; What We Do, supra note 20.
35. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)).
36. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 814–15.
37. Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)).
38. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
75-1613, at 3 (1937)). The organizational structure of the FTC reflects its evolving purpose
as a joint antitrust and consumer protection agency, as two of its primary departments are the
Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection. See Bureaus & Offices, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/NLY6-3SAH].
39. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 814–15.
40. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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discussion of the FTC’s enforcement authority under these statutes is
beyond the scope of this Note.
B. Development of the FTC’s Authority Under Section 5
Since the enactment of section 5, the FTC has sought to flesh out the
contours of its authority under the deception and unfairness prongs of
section 5.43 Part I.B.1 provides a brief overview of the development of the
FTC’s deception authority, and Part I.B.2 discusses the development of the
FTC’s unfairness authority. Part I.B.3 describes the FTC’s administrative
authority under section 5. Lastly, Part I.B.4 explains the choice that the
FTC has between adjudication and judicial enforcement when seeking to
hold companies accountable under section 5.
1. Deception Authority
Section 5 gives the FTC the authority to enforce Congress’s prohibition
against deceptive business practices.44 However, as Congress did not
define “deceptive practices” in section 5, the FTC had to develop its own
definition over time.45
In 1983, the FTC issued a policy statement identifying those elements
that it deemed relevant in considering whether a given act or practice was
deceptive.46 The FTC noted that it would consider a given action deceptive
“if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s
detriment.”47 Therefore, to show that a defendant has acted with
“deception” in violation of section 5, the FTC must prove three elements:
(1) there was a material representation, omission, or practice; (2) the
representation, omission, or practice was likely to mislead consumers; and
(3) the consumers were acting reasonably under the circumstances.48

42. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506).
43. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 821–23.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
45. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 821–23.
46. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984) (appending Letter from
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman,
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983)).
47. See id. at 176.
48. See, e.g., FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 124 F. Supp. 2d 193, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(laying out the established factors that the FTC must show to establish liability under its
deception authority). In the context of online privacy, the FTC initially relied on the
deception prong of its section 5 authority to hold companies accountable for failing to
deliver on the data security promises laid out in their privacy policies. See discussion infra
Part II.A. Although the FTC’s deception authority plays an important role in its data
security jurisprudence, further discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
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2. Unfairness Authority
Section 5 also gives the FTC the authority to enforce the prohibition
against unfair business practices.49 Following the amendment that added
the prohibition against “unfair and deceptive practices” to section 5,50 the
FTC spent several decades developing the meaning of “unfair” practices.51
Over that time, the Supreme Court held that “unfair” practices do not need
to be enumerated or set in stone and that the concept can be defined fluidly
over time.52
In response to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, the FTC issued a policy statement in 1980
setting forth its interpretation of “unfair practices.”53 Specifically, the FTC
explained that an unfairness determination requires consideration of three
factors: “(1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it
violates established public policy; [and] (3) whether it is unethical or
unscrupulous.”54
Despite the enumeration of these three factors, unfairness determinations
eventually relied primarily upon the policy statement’s “consumer injury”
prong.55 According to the policy statement, when analyzing this prong, the
FTC was required to find that consumer injury satisfied three tests: “[(1)]
[i]t must be substantial; [(2)] it must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice
produces; and [(3)] it must be an injury that consumers themselves could
not reasonably have avoided.”56 Congress subsequently codified these tests
under section 5.57

49. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
50. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
51. The FTC primarily interpreted the meaning of unfair practices by means of agency
adjudication. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
This practice was permissible under Supreme Court case law holding that federal agencies
have the discretion to promulgate policy via either rulemaking or adjudication. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947).
52. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) (discussing “unfairness” in the
context of competition); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40
(1972) (concluding that, under section 5, the FTC has the authority to proscribe unfair
practices vis-à-vis consumers).
53. See Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John
Danforth, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), appended to Int’l
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–72 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on
Unfairness]; cf. supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a policy
statement to clarify the FTC’s deception authority).
54. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 53, at 1072.
55. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 832.
56. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 53, at 1073.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799
F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2015) (outlining the development of the FTC’s unfairness authority
and citing the three-part test required for a finding of unfairness under section 5).
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3. Administrative Authority Under Section 5
In addition to granting substantive enforcement authority under section
5,58 Congress also has given the FTC rulemaking authority.59 Specifically,
Congress has empowered the FTC to promulgate “interpretive rules and
general statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive practices”60
and “rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”61 These two statutory grants of rulemaking
authority demonstrate the distinction between nonlegislative and legislative
rules.62
Legislative rules are rules that an agency promulgates pursuant to
congressionally delegated authority that an agency intends to have the
binding force of law.63 To justify this binding effect, agencies must issue
these rules by following strict procedures set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act64 (APA), such as providing for a public notice and comment
period and publishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register.65
With respect to the FTC’s legislative rulemaking authority under section
5, it is also required to “provide an opportunity for an informal hearing.”66
As this and other requisite procedures for the section 5 rulemaking process
make it rather arduous,67 the FTC has tended to promulgate policy through
adjudication.68
Where rules do not follow the strict procedural requirements for
legislative rules or are not promulgated pursuant to specific statutory

58. See supra Part I.B.1–2 (discussing the FTC’s authority to enforce Congress’s
prohibition against deceptive and unfair business practices).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a. Below, this Note proposes that the FTC should use its
nonlegislative rulemaking authority under section 5 to define “unfair practices” in the data
security context. See infra Part IV.A.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A).
61. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
62. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311,
1321–23 (1992) (describing the distinction between nonlegislative and legislative rules).
63. See id. at 1322.
64. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
65. See id. § 553(b).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1)(C). The FTC also is required to “publish notice of proposed
rulemaking” and “allow interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments.” Id.
§ 57a(b)(1)(A)–(B). Additionally, to promulgate a rule, the FTC must find that the “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices which are the subject of the proposed rulemaking are
prevalent.” Id. § 57a(b)(3). Lastly, the FTC is required to follow procedures set out in 5
U.S.C. § 553, which sets out the procedural requirements for informal rulemaking. 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(b)(1). These procedures include requiring an agency to publish a rule in the Federal
Register and to allow for a public comment period. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
67. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692.
68. See Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n on Data Security: Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th
Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (“[E]ffective
consumer protection requires that the Commission be able to promulgate these rules in a
more timely and efficient manner.”). As noted above, federal agencies have the discretion to
promulgate policy through either adjudication or rulemaking. See supra note 51.
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authority, they are termed “nonlegislative.”69 Although they can take on
many different forms, interpretive rules and policy statements are two
paradigmatic examples of nonlegislative rules.70 An interpretive rule is an
agency statement that explains to the public the agency’s interpretation of
the statutes and rules that it administers.71 By contrast, when an agency
issues policy statements, it is seeking to notify the public of the manner in
which it intends to exercise its discretionary power in the future.72 While
nonlegislative rules afford agencies more flexibility in communicating
policy to the public, they also tend to receive less deferential treatment in
court.73
4. Enforcement: The Choice Between
Adjudication and Judicial Action
When bringing an action enforcing section 5, the FTC can opt to pursue
either an administrative adjudication74 or judicial enforcement.75 If it
chooses the administrative process, the FTC issues a complaint against a
defendant,76 who then has the option to settle with the FTC by signing a
consent decree.77 Signing a consent decree is not an admission of
liability.78 Alternatively, the defendant can choose to contest the FTC’s
allegations, in which case there will be a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge79 (ALJ). Either party can appeal the ALJ’s decision to the
Commission itself.80 A defendant can appeal the Commission’s final
decision to the relevant federal court of appeals.81
Rather than taking the administrative route when enforcing section 5, the
FTC also can file a complaint in federal court seeking such remedies as
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, or consumer
69. See Anthony, supra note 62, at 1322–23.
70. See id. at 1323.
71. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
72. See id. For examples of policy statements, see supra notes 46, 53.
73. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that
nonlegislative rules such as interpretive rules and policy statements are not necessarily
entitled to significant deference from courts where there is no indication that Congress meant
for the rule to carry the force of law); see also infra Part IV.B.
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012).
75. See id. § 53(a)–(b).
76. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(a) (2015).
77. See id. § 2.31; see also Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 9, at II.A.1.a.
78. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (“[A consent decree] may state that the signing thereof is for
settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by any party that the law has
been violated as alleged in the complaint.”). Accordingly, defendants are incentivized to
settle with the FTC as soon as possible, which, in the data security context, has led to a lack
of judicial or administrative determinations to provide guidance to companies regarding
what the FTC deems as “unfair” data security practices. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7,
at 588; infra note 150.
79. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.1.
80. See id. § 3.52(b)(1). The Commission generally consists of five presidentially
nominated commissioners. See Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
about-ftc/commissioners (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/QHT8-8DKX].
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2012).
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redress.82 Indeed, even when enforcing administrative decisions, the FTC
requires the aid of a court.83
Judicial enforcement has the advantage of enabling the FTC to pursue
injunctive and monetary relief at the same time.84 However, administrative
adjudication provides certain procedural advantages such as giving the FTC
the first opportunity to make findings of fact85 and keeping the first
appellate step within the Commission.86 Moreover, if an administrative
decision goes up for judicial review, a reviewing court will likely afford it
significant deference where it involves an FTC interpretation of a statute.87
Given these procedural advantages, the FTC typically opts for the
administrative process, particularly when faced with unique, fact-driven
cases.88
Having examined the FTC’s authority under section 5 generally, this
Note now considers the application of that authority to online privacy and
data security.
II. JUST BE REASONABLE!:
THE APPLICATION OF THE FTC’S UNFAIRNESS
AUTHORITY IN THE DATA SECURITY CONTEXT
Over the past decade and a half, the FTC has been on the forefront of
online privacy enforcement.89 In that capacity, the Commission has
brought the section 5 authority discussed in Part I to bear in a new and
evolving context. Accordingly, Part II.A explains the development of the
FTC’s general internet privacy enforcement. Part II.B discusses how the
FTC has applied its unfairness authority in the data security context.
Finally, Part II.C considers recent challenges to the FTC’s use of its
unfairness authority in the data security context.
A. Evolution of the FTC’s Online Privacy Enforcement
In the early days of the internet, the FTC addressed online privacy
concerns by encouraging industry self-regulation.90 The rationale at the
time was that the free market would punish any companies that failed to
82. See id. § 53(a)–(b).
83. See Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 9, at II.A.2 (noting that the FTC must
receive the aid of a court to obtain consumer redress for violations of administrative orders).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b)(1) (2015); supra note 80 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that, in certain circumstances, courts should afford significant deference to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute).
88. See Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 9, at II.A.2. Thus, in the data security
context, the FTC has primarily proceeded via the administrative process. See Stegmaier &
Bartnick, supra note 6, at 690.
89. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015);
Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 674.
90. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/
priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/A77W-AZ2F]; see also Scott, supra note 10, at 130.
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protect consumer data.91 Thus, the FTC limited its section 5 enforcement in
the internet privacy context to situations where a company failed to live up
to the promises it had made in its published privacy policy.92
This enforcement strategy reflected what is called the “notice-and-choice
model” of privacy enforcement.93 This model sought to encourage
companies to develop detailed privacy policies so that consumers would be
informed as to how companies would use their personal information.94
As applied in FTC enforcement actions, the notice-and-choice model
corresponds with the FTC’s deception authority under section 5.95 For
example, in its first internet privacy enforcement action, the FTC alleged
that GeoCities, a website that enabled users to organize personal, interestbased websites in topical “neighborhoods,” had misrepresented its actual
information collection practices in its published privacy policy.96 The
FTC’s complaint resulted in a consent order wherein GeoCities agreed to
implement better privacy practices.97 The FTC continued to use this
enforcement strategy for several years.98
Despite its success in early, internet-based section 5 enforcement
actions,99 the FTC determined that industry self-regulation and its
enforcement of privacy policies were insufficient to ensure the protection of
consumer information online and decided to engage in more robust
enforcement.100 As a result, the FTC began relying more heavily on its

91. See Scott, supra note 10, at 130.
92. See id.
93. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 815–16. The model finds its origins in a collection of
widely accepted principles, which reflect best practices in privacy protection known as the
Fair Information Practice Principles. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at
7–11. The Fair Information Practice Principles consist of “(1) Notice/Awareness; (2)
Choice/Consent; (3)
Access/Participation; (4)
Integrity/Security; and (5)
Enforcement/Redress.” Id. at 7.
94. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 2 (2012), https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protectingconsumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJD5-879Y]. Notably, the notice-and-choice model has been criticized for
incentivizing companies to create very long privacy policies that are hardly understandable
to most consumers. See id.; see also infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
95. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 812 (arguing that the notice-and-choice model
corresponds with the FTC’s section 5 deception authority).
96. See GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 96–98 (1999) (laying out the FTC’s allegations of
deception); see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC
Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy
Case (Aug. 13, 1998) [hereinafter GeoCities Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/1998/08/internet-site-agrees-settle-ftc-charges-deceptively-collecting
[https://perma.cc/S8WM-24E4].
97. See GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. at 121–33; see also GeoCities Press Release, supra note
96 (“GeoCities has agreed to post on its site a clear and prominent Privacy Notice, telling
consumers what information is being collected and for what purpose, to whom it will be
disclosed, and how consumers can access and remove the information.”).
98. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 835.
99. See discussion supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
100. See Scott, supra note 10, at 130–31.
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unfairness authority.101 This adjustment in enforcement strategy signaled a
new focus on the “harm-based model” of privacy enforcement,102 which
seeks to protect consumers from specific harms such as economic loss and
unauthorized intrusion into their private lives.103
The FTC first exercised its unfairness authority in the online privacy
context in an enforcement action against ReverseAuction.com.104 There,
the FTC alleged that ReverseAuction.com, an early eBay competitor, had
signed into eBay, obtained eBay users’ personal information, and then sent
those users unsolicited emails misrepresenting that their eBay accounts
were going to expire.105 The FTC argued that the company’s deeds were
actionable under section 5 as either a deceptive or unfair business
practice.106 With regard to unfairness, the FTC, relying on the three-part
test required for a finding of unfairness under section 5,107 alleged that
ReverseAuction.com’s business practices were “likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which [was] not reasonably avoidable by consumers
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition,
and therefore was . . . an unfair practice.”108
Although the FTC commissioners approved the resulting consent order,
the FTC’s reliance on its unfairness authority elicited several dissenting
opinions.109 FTC Commissioners Thomas Leary and Orson Swindle argued
that the use of the FTC’s unfairness authority was inappropriate because
they did not believe the consumer injury was sufficiently substantial.110
Conversely, FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson argued that the use of
the FTC’s unfairness authority was appropriate because the consumers had
indeed suffered a significant injury as their individual “privacy
expectation[s]” and “consumer confidence” generally were undermined.111
As demonstrated by the FTC’s increasing use of its unfairness authority in

101. See id. at 143.
102. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 815–16.
103. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 2. Like the notice-and-choice model, the
harm-based model has faced criticism. See id. (“[The harm-based model has] been criticized
for failing to recognize a wider range of privacy-related concerns, including reputational
harm or the fear of being monitored.”); see also infra notes 211–12. In contrast to the
notice-and-choice model, which corresponds to the FTC’s deception authority, see supra
note 95 and accompanying text, the harm-based model corresponds to the FTC’s unfairness
authority. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 812.
104. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 835–36.
105. See Complaint ¶¶ 6–13, FTC v. Reverseauction.com, No. 1:00-CV-00032 (D.D.C.
Jan. 6, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2000/01/www.ftc_.
gov-reversecmp.htm [https://perma.cc/RF6G-437L]; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter
ReverseAuction.com Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2000/01/online-auction-site-settles-ftc-privacy-charges [https://perma.cc/KS4M-KD7C].
106. Complaint, supra note 105, ¶¶ 16–17.
107. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
108. Complaint, supra note 105, ¶ 17.
109. See ReverseAuction.com Press Release, supra note 105; see also Serwin, supra note
21, at 836–37.
110. See ReverseAuction.com Press Release, supra note 105.
111. See id.
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B. Increasing Use of the FTC’s Unfairness Authority
in the Data Security Context
In addition to applying its unfairness authority to online privacy
generally,114 the FTC also applies this authority in actions against
companies that have suffered data security breaches.115 As noted above,116
when the FTC brings actions pursuant to its unfairness authority under
section 5, it must show that the defendant-company was engaged in an act
or practice that “cause[d] or [was] likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which [was] not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers.”117
In the data security context, the FTC primarily seeks to hold companies
accountable via administrative action,118 and its complaints frequently
allege that defendants engaged in “unfair” practices by failing to employ
“reasonable” or “adequate” data security measures to protect consumer
data.119 As a result of the FTC’s administrative process, the FTC and a
defendant-company almost always enter into a consent order wherein the
defendant agrees to implement improved security practices and submit to
data security-related oversight for a period of up to twenty years.120
For example, in BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,121 the FTC alleged that
hackers accessed unencrypted consumer data such as bank and credit card
information as a result of BJ’s Wholesale Club’s (“BJ’s”) inadequate data
security practices.122 The FTC argued that BJ’s had failed to use
“reasonable and appropriate” data security measures to protect consumer
information.123 This failure, according to the complaint, was sufficient to
enable the FTC to bring an enforcement action against BJ’s relying solely
upon its unfairness authority.124 Rather than contesting the FTC’s
allegations, BJ’s immediately entered into a consent agreement with the

112. See infra Part II.B.
113. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 837.
114. See discussion supra notes 104–13 and accompanying text.
115. See Scott, supra note 10, at 143.
116. See supra Part I.B.2.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also supra Part I.B.2.
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). For a description of this process, see supra notes 77–81 and
accompanying text.
119. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692–93. The principal argument against
the FTC’s strategy in the data security context is that it does not specify which practices are
“reasonable” or “adequate.” See infra Part III.A.2–3.
120. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 690–91.
121. 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005).
122. See id. at 466–68.
123. See id. at 467. In particular, the complaint alleged that “[a]mong other things,” BJ’s
had failed to encrypt sensitive consumer information, stored information in such a way that it
could be accessed easily and anonymously, and failed to use “readily available security
measures” to identify unauthorized access to consumer data. Id.
124. See id. at 468.
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FTC in which it agreed, among other things, to implement more robust data
security procedures and submit to biennial third-party data security
auditing.125 Other FTC data security cases relying on the FTC’s unfairness
authority generally follow a similar pattern.126 Consequently, companies
and scholars argue that there is a significant lack of case law or adjudicatory
guidance regarding what minimum data security measures the FTC requires
of companies under its unfairness authority.127
C. Challenges to the Use of the FTC’s Unfairness Authority
in the Data Security Context
In response to the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority in the data
security context, respondents’ primary challenge is that the Commission’s
complaints only vaguely terms defendants’ “unfair” practices as
“unreasonable” or “inadequate.”128 Thus, companies contend that they
have not been given sufficient notice as to the FTC’s data security
requirements.129 Two recent examples that illustrate this challenge are
LabMD, Inc.130 and FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.131
In LabMD, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against LabMD, a
company that tests medical samples and reports test results to consumers’
healthcare providers.132 By means of its testing procedures, LabMD
acquires personal consumer data such as names, Social Security numbers,
and medical information.133 Additionally, the company uses computers to
transmit information including private consumer data.134 The FTC alleged
that LabMD “failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security for
personal information” by, “[a]mong other things,” not having a
comprehensive information security plan, not implementing commonly
used security measures, and not training its employees in effective data
security practices.135 The FTC contended that, as a result of these
inadequacies, an identify thief in California was found in possession of
consumer data, such as names and Social Security numbers, illegally
obtained from LabMD.136
125. See id. at 469–73.
126. See, e.g., Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 (2010); DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117
(2006).
127. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 588; see also infra Parts II.C, III.A.
128. See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692–93 (noting that, in the data
security context, the FTC has “use[d] terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘adequate,’ or
‘proper’” when outlining which practices a defendant-company has failed to use and that
these “failures ‘taken together’ violate [s]ection 5”).
129. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
130. No. 9357
(F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter [https://perma.cc/3PP7-PN4N].
131. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
132. Complaint at 1, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/130829labmdpart3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LDS8LLQ].
133. See id. at 2.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 3.
136. See id. at 5.
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Rather than capitulating to the FTC’s complaint,137 LabMD filed an
answer in which it argued that the FTC had failed to give adequate notice as
to “what data-security practices the Commission believes [s]ection
5 . . . forbids or requires.”138 In so doing, it became one of the few
companies to challenge the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority in the data
security context.139
Wyndham represents another case in which a company responded to an
alleged violation of section 5 for failing to implement “reasonable” data
security practices by arguing that the FTC had not provided adequate notice
as to what its minimum data security requirements are.140 There, the FTC
alleged that Wyndham, a global hospitality company, engaged in data
security practices that, “taken together, unreasonably . . . exposed
consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”141 These
inadequate practices included, for example, the storage of credit card
information as easily readable text, the failure to use firewalls to secure
sensitive information, and the failure to use “reasonable measures to detect
and prevent unauthorized access.”142 The FTC alleged that Wyndham’s
“unreasonable” data security practices led to three data security breaches in
a two-year period, each perpetrated by hackers.143
On interlocutory appeal before the Third Circuit from the district court’s
denial of its motion to dismiss, Wyndham argued that the FTC had not
provided constitutionally adequate fair notice that its practices could violate
section 5.144 In response, the FTC argued that Wyndham had received
rather robust notice.145 Specifically, the FTC argued that Wyndham
received notice of the Commission’s data security requirements by means
of the complaints and consent decrees from other FTC data security
enforcement actions, which the FTC publishes on its website.146
Additionally, the FTC contended that many of the inadequate practices that

137. See discussion supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
138. Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Answer and Defenses to Administrative Complaint at 7,
LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/09/
110917labmdanswer.pdf [https://perma.cc/562Z-ADG9].
139. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 610–11. As of this writing, a disposition on the
merits is still pending. See LabMD, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (Feb. 5,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter
[https://perma.cc/3PP7-PN4N].
140. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
141. Id. (quoting Complaint at ¶ 24, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d
602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 13-1887(ES))).
142. Id. at 240–41.
143. See id. at 241–42.
144. See id. at 240. Wyndham also argued that the FTC lacked the statutory authority
under the unfairness prong of section 5 to regulate data security. See id. Regarding this
issue, the court held that data security practices can fall within the plain meaning of “unfair”
under section 5 and that congressional action after the enactment of section 5 had not
preempted that statute’s use in the context of data security. See id. at 248–49.
145. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 40–52, Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (No. 14-3514),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141105wyndham_3cir_ftcbrief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8U4G-W9S5].
146. See id. at 45–52.
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Wyndham had in place were addressed in a widely available FTC guide147
published before Wyndham suffered its first data security breach.148
The court stated that, where an entity can reasonably foresee that its
conduct violates a statute, there is constitutionally adequate notice.149 As
Wyndham had access to publically available FTC complaints filed against
other companies that had similarly inadequate data security practices and
FTC statements regarding data security generally, in addition to the fact that
it had suffered “not one or two, but three” data security breaches, the court
held that, as applied to Wyndham, there was constitutionally adequate
notice.150
In sum, LabMD and Wyndham provide recent examples of overarching
concerns that the FTC has not provided companies with sufficient guidance
as to what it considers to be “reasonable” data security practices for
purposes of section 5 enforcement.151 This Note now turns to consider
scholarly proposals that have sought to give substance to the FTC’s data
security requirements, specifically as they relate to enforcement actions
relying on the FTC’s unfairness authority.
III. WAIT, WHAT’S REASONABLE?:
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE FTC’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHAT IT DEEMS TO BE
UNFAIR DATA SECURITY PRACTICES
In light of the FTC’s arguably vague complaints and the relative lack of
case law or other guidance regarding what constitutes sufficient data
security measures under the FTC’s unfairness authority, there is a sense in
the legal community that the FTC has not provided sufficient guidance to
companies regarding what “reasonable” or “adequate” data security
measures they should implement.152 This part considers and provides a
critical analysis of proposals to promote a data security enforcement regime

147. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE
BUSINESS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus69protecting-personal-information-guide-business_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/39X8-ZZ5Q].
A
version of this guide was available in 2007. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 145,
at 49.
148. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 145, at 49–52.
149. See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256.
150. See id. at 256–59. Despite the Third Circuit’s holding that Wyndham received fair
notice, this Note argues that, even if the FTC has given constitutionally adequate notice, as a
policy matter it still has not given sufficient notice to regulated entities regarding its
minimum data security requirements. See infra Part IV.A. In December 2015, Wyndham
settled with the FTC. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wyndham Settles FTC
Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-itunfairly-placed-consumers-payment [https://perma.cc/C9UK-VZ2L]; see also supra note 78.
151. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10, at 143–44; Serwin, supra note 21, at 812–13;
Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 676. But see Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 589
(arguing that the FTC’s enforcement actions essentially have created a new area of privacy
common law).
FOR
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that better informs companies of those data security practices that the FTC
deems “unfair.”
A. Proposed Solutions
At present, there are multiple perspectives on this issue, which this Note
broadly characterizes as: (1) the ad hoc approach; (2) the legislative fix;
(3) the administrative fix; and (4) a proposal for a new privacy framework.
Each of these is discussed in turn.153
1. The Ad Hoc Approach
With respect to notifying companies of its data security requirements, the
FTC has, until now, engaged in an essentially ad hoc, enforcement-based
approach.154 Relying upon adjudication to advance its data security
policy,155 the FTC publishes complaints and consent orders from
enforcement actions regarding inadequate data security practices on its
website.156 The Commission contends that, by providing companies with
documents from past data security enforcement actions listing specific
practices that violate section 5, it adequately notifies those companies of its
evolving data security requirements.157 Additionally, the FTC notes that it
publishes various online guidance brochures discussing data security best
practices.158 The FTC also has begun hosting live “Start with Security”
events, which enable the FTC “to provide companies with practical tips and
strategies for implementing effective data security.”159

153. Scholars have noted that there is a “dearth of scholarship” in this area. Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 7, at 588. Therefore, there is not an extensive body of literature for this
Note to review. Nevertheless, the relative scholarly silence regarding such a pressing
societal issue serves to underscore the importance of this Note’s thesis.
154. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692.
155. Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., the FTC can opt to promulgate policy via
adjudication. See supra notes 51, 68.
156. See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 23,
2005),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3160/bjs-wholesale-clubinc-matter [https://perma.cc/68FD-9DWM]; Dave & Buster’s, Inc., in the Matter of, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (June 8, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0823153/dave-busters-incin-matter [https://perma.cc/X645-J3P2]; TJX Companies, the, Inc., in
the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/072-3055/tjx-companies-inc-matter [https://perma.cc/2WZN-TCWY].
157. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 145, at 45–49.
158. See, e.g., id. at 49–52. For examples of such guidance, see FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 147; FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS
(2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwith
security.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8JT-SRRW]. The FTC also has a webpage dedicated to data
security. See Data Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/privacy-and-security/data-security (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (providing links to
videos and other FTC webpages with data security-related guidance) [https://perma.cc/
HBX7-GZ8X].
159. Start with Security—Austin, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/events-calendar/2015/11/start-security-austin (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (describing
one such event in Austin, Texas) [https://perma.cc/3WQ5-A4ZT].
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Professors Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog argue that the FTC’s
current practice is on the right track.160 While discussing the FTC’s role in
privacy enforcement generally, they have argued that the FTC has
essentially developed a body of privacy “common law” through their
various complaints, consent orders, and guidance materials, which, when
considered as a whole, constitute a robust body of online privacy and data
security jurisprudence.161
More specifically, Solove and Hartzog contend that the FTC’s many data
security complaints and consent orders are the functional equivalent of
judicial common law, not only because the orders are published on the
FTC’s website and the Commission typically follows a given order in
subsequent enforcement actions, but also because lawyers look to these
documents when advising corporate clients on data security matters.162
Additionally, the authors liken other materials published by the FTC
regarding its data security requirements—such as press releases and online
guidance163—to dicta in judicial opinions, as they, too, provide some sense
of what the FTC requires of companies in terms of minimum data security
requirements.164
Solove and Hartzog go on to argue that the FTC has developed
overarching principles within its privacy and data security
“jurisprudence.”165 For instance, mimicking the incremental development
of common law,166 the FTC has begun requiring through its data security
enforcement actions that companies follow ever more specific data security
standards.167 In response to the argument that the FTC does not adequately
notify companies of its minimum data security requirements, the authors
provide a list of twenty-five “standards” identified in data security-related
complaints and consent orders.168 Thus, according to the authors, the
FTC’s data security jurisprudence provides ample notice of its data security
expectations.169
In addition, Solove and Hartzog argue that the FTC’s data security
jurisprudence has provided companies with a “baseline” to follow.170
Drawing from established industry norms and resulting consumer
160. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 589. Although the article addresses the
FTC’s involvement in privacy enforcement generally, the authors do spend considerable
time discussing the FTC’s data security jurisprudence. See id. at 650–55 (explaining the
specific data security practices that the FTC has identified by means of data security
enforcement cases).
161. See id. at 585–86.
162. See id. at 621–22.
163. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
164. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 626.
165. See id. at 627. With regard to the FTC’s data security jurisprudence under its
unfairness authority, Solove and Hartzog’s discussion is limited to the most general of terms.
See id. at 643 (“[T]he FTC deem[s] . . . defendants’ lack of adequate security measures to be
an unfair practice.”).
166. See id. at 648.
167. See id. at 590.
168. See id. at 650–55.
169. See id. at 650–51.
170. See id. at 661.
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expectations, the authors suggest that the FTC has demanded “adequate
data security” as a requirement to avoid liability under the unfairness prong
of section 5.171
In light of the FTC’s growing privacy and data security jurisprudence,
Solove and Hartzog call upon the FTC to continue drawing from industry
norms, as well as the consumer expectations those norms created, to give
ever more substance to its requirement that companies employ “reasonable”
data security measures.172 Moreover, they suggest that the FTC should be
emboldened to continue enforcing data security breaches under the
unfairness authority of section 5.173
2. The Legislative Fix
In contrast to those who believe that the FTC’s current practice is best, at
least one scholar would rely on Congress to provide a direct statutory grant
of authority to the FTC to enforce unfair data security practices.174 For
example, Professor Michael D. Scott has maintained that, because the FTC
has neither provided for hearings or public comment nor promulgated
legislative or nonlegislative rules, companies have received no real
guidance as to which data security practices the FTC deems to be unfair.175
Indeed, Scott has gone further by suggesting that the FTC may be
exceeding its statutory authority by bringing its unfairness authority to bear
on companies that suffer data security breaches.176 By applying the threepronged test required for a finding of unfairness under section 5177 to extant
FTC data security cases, he has sought to show that allegations of
unfairness against companies that suffered data security breaches do not
pass statutory muster.178
As to substantial injury, Scott notes that FTC data security cases relying
on an unfairness theory contain no allegations of substantial monetary
loss.179 The FTC argues that consumers are substantially injured to the
extent that they are inconvenienced by having to deal with identity theft and
that there is significant monetary injury when the total amount of fraudulent

171. Id. at 661–62.
172. See id. at 673.
173. See id. at 676. The article concludes by suggesting that there is more room for the
FTC’s data security jurisprudence to be fleshed out. See id. (“This Article is hopefully the
start of a more sustained examination of the FTC, the body of [privacy] law it has developed,
and the future directions that law can take.”). This Note intends to be a step in that direction.
174. See Scott, supra note 10, at 183.
175. See id. at 143–44.
176. See id. at 129. Professor Scott’s article was written before the Third Circuit held that
inadequate data security practices could lead to a finding of unfairness for the purposes of
section 5. See supra note 144.
177. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. For reference, the FTC must show
that consumer injury was: (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by any countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) an injury that consumers themselves could not
reasonably have avoided. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
178. See Scott, supra note 10, at 151–65.
179. See id. at 153.
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purchases made by identity thieves is aggregated.180 Scott maintains,
however, that these are not actionable injuries under section 5 because there
is no showing of an actual, specific, monetary loss to consumers.181
Looking to the next prong of the three-part test for a finding of
unfairness, Scott notes that companies must strike a balance between having
no data security, which is certainly unreasonable, and perfect security,
which is unachievable.182 However, as the FTC has not provided for
hearings or public comment regarding unfair data security practices, he
explains that there is no way for companies realistically to strike that
balance.183 Thus, Scott concludes, the FTC cannot accurately determine
whether injuries are outweighed by benefits to competition or consumers.184
Lastly, Scott considers consumers’ ability to avoid being exposed to a
data security breach.185 As it would be patently unreasonable to require
that consumers refrain from things such as using credit cards, Scott
determines that the third prong required for a finding of unfairness would
weigh in the FTC’s favor.186
Based on the foregoing analysis, Scott suggests that the FTC has
exceeded its statutory authority under section 5 by bringing unfairness cases
against companies who have suffered data security breaches.187
Accordingly, he proposes an overarching legislative fix that would
explicitly direct the FTC to regulate corporate data security.188
With respect to specifics, in addition to granting the FTC jurisdiction
over data security under section 5, Scott’s proposed legislation would
require the FTC to promulgate legislative rules directing companies to
implement “policies and procedures regarding information security
practices.”189 Notably, this rulemaking authority would lack the additional
procedural burdens currently in place under section 5.190 Finally, the
proposed statute would explicitly state that the FTC’s enforcement authority

180. See id. at 157.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 160.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 161–62.
186. See id. Scott also argues that the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority against
companies that have suffered data security breaches is questionable at best because there is
no “clearly established” public policy regarding data security breaches. See id. at 162–65.
187. See id. at 183. As a result, according to Scott, a company subject to data security
breaches must now chose either to avoid competing in sectors where consumer data could be
compromised or overinvest in new technology to ensure compliance with the FTC’s
requirements. See id. at 171.
188. See generally id. at 177–82. For his proposal, Scott draws on other statutes that give
the FTC industry-specific jurisdiction over certain data security breaches. See id. at 172.
189. Id. at 178. Under Scott’s proposal, the FTC will explicitly look to “generally
accepted national and international information security standards” to give substance to its
requirements. Id. at 179.
190. See id. at 178 (requiring that the FTC follow 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) when
promulgating rules under the proposed statute); see also supra notes 66–67 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedural burdens currently in place under section 5).
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vis-à-vis data security breaches is derived from section 5 itself.191
Ultimately, Scott’s goal is to ensure that companies know what the FTC
considers to be unfair data security practices so that they can implement
proper security measures to adequately protect consumer data.192
3. The Administrative Fix
Also in opposition to the FTC’s current practices, others contend that the
FTC should exercise its administrative authority by promulgating
regulations that detail what it expects of companies in terms of data security
practices.193 Put another way, these scholars would have the FTC issue
data security guidance via legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking.194 Two
attorneys who specialize in information privacy practice, Gerard Stegmaier
and Wendell Bartnick, have offered such a proposal.195
Much like Professor Scott, Stegmaier and Bartnick argue that the FTC
has provided little ascertainable guidance to companies regarding which
data security practices it considers unfair.196 The authors explain that the
FTC has contented itself with providing notice to companies via its
published complaints and consent decrees and its online data security
reports.197 This general practice, to the authors, is not enough to provide
adequate notice198 because it does nothing more than explain that certain
“unreasonable” practices “taken together” add up to liability under the
FTC’s unfairness authority.199
In response to the FTC’s current practice, Stegmaier and Bartnick
suggest that the FTC ought to engage in legislative rulemaking that

191. See Scott, supra note 10, at 180. In addition to making the FTC’s data security
enforcement authority explicit, Scott notes that his statute would provide the added benefit of
allowing for public input during the rulemaking process. See id. at 183.
192. See id. As of this writing, there is data security legislation pending before the
Senate. See Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015).
This bill grants the FTC specific authority to regulate data security breaches under section 5.
See id. § 5(c)(1). However, the bill appears to grant the FTC the same rulemaking authority
that is has under section 5. See id. § 5(c)(2). In other words, the FTC would be subject to the
same onerous rulemaking procedures as it is under section 5 already. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
193. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 720.
194. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.3.
195. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 720. The authors suggest that the FTC
has not provided constitutionally adequate notice to companies of which data security
practices it considers to be unfair. See id. at 706. It bears repeating that, after they published
their article, the Third Circuit held that, at least as applied, the FTC has adequately provided
companies with such notice. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256–59
(3d Cir. 2015); see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
196. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 695.
197. See id. at 691–94. The authors do note that, under SEC v. Chenery Corp., the FTC
has the discretion to choose to promulgate policy via adjudication rather than rulemaking.
See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 691.
198. See id. at 695. Indeed, Stegmaier and Bartnick maintain that “[e]ven if the FTC has
provided enough notice to meet constitutional requirements, . . . its current efforts are
inadequate.” Id. at 676.
199. See id. at 691–93.
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explicitly lays out what it considers to be unfair data security practices.200
First, the authors note that the FTC already has successfully engaged in data
security-based legislative rulemaking under certain industry-specific
statutes which grant the FTC express authority to enforce data security
breaches.201 Given these successes, Stegmaier and Bartnick argue that the
legislative rulemaking process under section 5 itself would be beneficial
because it would provide notice to regulated companies via the required
notice-and-comment period and allow companies to provide input toward
any proposed rule.202 Additionally, the authors claim that specific guidance
as to the FTC’s minimum data security requirements provided in a
legislative rule would prevent companies from overinvesting in unnecessary
data security measures in an effort to avoid liability.203 With respect to the
onerous procedural requirements for legislative rulemaking under section
5,204 Stegmaier and Bartnick maintain that the costs of the rulemaking
process will be outweighed by the savings derived from increased industry
compliance, which would be spurred by clearer, more ascertainable data
security requirements.205 Aside from legislative rulemaking, Stegmaier and
Bartnick also suggest that nonlegislative rules, in whichever form, that
more specifically outline what the FTC considers to be unfair data security
practices, may also serve to provide improved notice to companies as
against the FTC’s current practices.206
Stegmaier and Bartnick recommend that any rule, legislative or
nonlegislative, that the FTC promulgates must be more specific than the
FTC’s current reasonableness requirement.207 To these authors, adequate
notice requires more practical requirements that help companies understand
what data security practices would be considered “unfair” for the purposes
of section 5.208
4. A Proposal for a New Privacy Framework
Lastly, Andrew Serwin, an attorney who practices in the areas of privacy
and cybersecurity, has proposed an entirely new framework for privacy

200. See id. at 707. Stegmaier and Bartnick also suggest that the FTC, in lieu of or in
addition to legislative rulemaking, should continue to engage in formal adjudication and
litigation. See id. at 714–15. According to the authors, these processes would provide
greater notice to regulated companies than the FTC’s current practices because they would
receive, in the case of formal adjudication, more specific FTC findings of facts and, in the
case of litigation, judicial decisions on the merits regarding violations of section 5. See id.
201. See id. at 708.
202. See id. at 710–11.
203. See id.; see also supra note 187.
204. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
205. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 712. Moreover, the authors contend that
the FTC will see additional savings in investigation and litigation costs because clearer data
security rules would make it easier for the Commission to identify and enforce unfair data
security practices. See id.
206. See id. at 715–17.
207. See id. at 717–20; see also supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
208. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 717.
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enforcement in the United States.209 In his article, he notes that the noticeand-choice210 and the harm-based models211 have failed to engender
effective enforcement.212 He then goes on to discuss three distinct “models
for privacy,”213 which include the accountability model,214 processing
limitations model,215 and proportionality model.216
Serwin defines the accountability model of privacy as a regime in which
companies are held accountable for how they handle consumer data.217 In
his view, this model relies heavily upon reactive and involuntary privacy
enforcement.218 While he deems enforcement to be an important part of
any privacy regime, Serwin does not consider it to be the appropriate focal
point because any regime based primarily upon enforcement leaves
regulated entities without any meaningful ex ante guidance.219
Serwin next considers the processing limitations model, which he
explains has its focus on restricting the use of information.220 As with the
accountability model, he maintains that this model, while important, cannot
be the focus of a privacy regime because any restrictions on data usage
should be based on an ascertainable governing principle.221
Lastly, to provide privacy regulation with a governing principle, Serwin
discusses a proportionality-based privacy model,222 which relies on the
premise that privacy safeguards should be related to the sensitivity of the
data they are meant to protect.223 Under this regime, Serwin would propose
a four-tiered framework—ranging from “nonsensitive” to “highly
sensitive”—that would categorize specific types of data by sensitivity.224
Thus, Serwin’s proposal would define how sensitive a given type of
consumer information is and attach to that categorization an attendant set of
security requirements based upon industry best practices.225 This approach,
Serwin argues, would govern both the limitations on the use of data and the

209. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 812–13.
210. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
212. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 842–44. Serwin also notes that the FTC itself has
recognized that these models have been somewhat ineffective. See id. at 843.
213. See id. at 844.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 848.
216. See id. at 849.
217. See id. at 846.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 848 (“[A]n accountability-centric model would be like passing
comprehensive privacy legislation and simply saying, ‘If you violate someone’s privacy you
will be liable for a $10,000 fine,’ without defining what data is covered or what acts are
prohibited.”).
220. See id.
221. See id. at 849 (“[A process limitations-centric model] would be like passing
legislation that provides restrictions on the use of data without defining data in the first
place.”).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 852.
224. See id. at 850.
225. See id. at 851.
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appropriate means of enforcement based upon the sensitivity of the data in
question.226
Serwin goes on to outline a number of benefits to a proportionality-based
privacy model.227 For example, he notes that a preexisting tier system
would serve to protect consumer information ex ante by enabling
companies to use data security practices to prevent breaches rather than
relying on ex post enforcement.228 Additionally, Serwin explains that his
proposed framework would provide administrative flexibility as any given
type of information could be moved between tiers.229 Serwin also contends
that this regime would help provide guidance to companies so that they
could know, at the outset, where a given dataset falls on the sensitivity
continuum.230
With respect to implementation, Serwin expresses ambivalence as
between administrative rulemaking and legislation.231 In either case, he
would encourage the development of a new regime wherein the FTC would
administer a voluntary, proportionality-based program that would seek to
encourage companies to implement best practices.232 Compliance with this
regime would provide a safe harbor, immunizing compliant companies
from enforcement actions.233
B. A Critical Analysis of Proposed Solutions
Although each of the proposals discussed in Part III.A has its merits, this
Note contends that there is room for improvement. Part III.B analyzes each
of the proposals discussed in Part III.A in light of important societal
interests. As noted above,234 these interests include the need for better
notice to regulated entities,235 the FTC’s goal of robust consumer
protection,236 and the FTC’s need for administrative flexibility given the
ever-evolving technological environment that it is regulating.237
1. The Ad Hoc Approach
Advocates of the ad hoc approach, such as the FTC itself along with
Solove and Hartzog, believe that the FTC’s current strategy, which focuses
on enforcement and relies upon published complaints, consent orders, and
online guidance to provide notice, adequately informs companies of the
FTC’s minimum data security requirements.238 This Note argues that, at
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id. at 850.
See id. at 851–52.
See id. at 851.
See id.
See id. at 852.
See id. at 854.
See id. at 812–13.
See id.
See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 706–07.
See What We Do, supra note 20.
See Serwin, supra note 21, at 852.
See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
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least as to consumer protection and notice to regulated companies, this
approach falls short.
The ad hoc approach does provide the FTC with a great deal of
administrative flexibility. As it can opt to promulgate policy via
adjudication,239 this approach enables the FTC to pick and choose which
data security breaches to enforce. Thus, through enforcement, the FTC can
continue to bring actions against companies that it deems to have engaged
in “unfair” data security practices.240
As to consumer protection, the ad hoc approach provides robust ex post
protection. In other words, after a security breach occurs, the FTC will
bring an enforcement action against a company if it believes the company
employed “unfair” data security practices.241 While this strategy may well
vindicate certain consumers’ injuries, it ignores robust ex ante protection,
which would serve to protect consumers before a data security breach
occurs by ensuring that companies have the proper incentives to employ
data security best practices.242 The benefit of ex ante protection is that it
helps to prevent the very breaches that the FTC enforces.
This approach also fails to provide adequate notice to companies of
which practices the FTC considers “unfair.” The FTC’s complaints and
consent orders merely list data security practices that, “taken together,” add
up to unfair practices.243 While the FTC’s online guidance is a step in the
right direction,244 it lacks the specifics necessary to ensure that companies
know exactly what they need to do to avoid liability under the FTC’s
unfairness authority.
These shortcomings are illustrated well by the case against Wyndham.245
If Wyndham had been provided ex ante notice of which data security
practices it needed to implement to comply with FTC standards, it could
have ensured that it had proper data security measures in place to better
protect consumer information.246
Solove and Hartzog contend that the FTC’s complaints and consent
orders provide a great deal of standards, which illustrate that the FTC, as a
baseline, requires companies to employ “adequate data security
[practices].”247 However, this baseline still forces companies to ask,
“Which of the practices required of the respondent company in any given
enforcement action are required of my company?”

239. See supra notes 51, 68, 155.
240. See supra Part II.B (discussing the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority in the data
security context).
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra notes 219, 228 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., supra note 141 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 158 (providing examples of such guidance).
245. See supra notes 140–50 and accompanying text.
246. See infra Part IV.A.
247. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 661–62; see also supra notes 165–71 and
accompanying text.
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2. The Legislative Fix
Professor Scott argues that Congress must enact a statute to enable the
FTC to police data security breaches under section 5.248 This Note takes
the view that this proposal fails to provide sufficient administrative
flexibility.
First, Scott’s proposal would resolve the current lack of notice to
companies regarding the FTC’s minimum data security requirements. His
proposed statute would require the FTC to engage in legislative rulemaking
with respect to data security requirements under section 5.249 This
requirement would ensure that companies would receive improved notice,
through both the notice-and-comment period and the promulgation of any
final rule,250 of which data security practices the FTC deems “unfair.”
Relatedly, this proposal would have the benefit of providing for ex ante
and ex post consumer protection. Any rules promulgated pursuant to
Scott’s proposed statute would give regulated companies a better
understanding of which practices the FTC considers unfair.251 Thus, they
would be able to employ these practices and better protect consumer
information before a breach occurs.252 Moreover, Scott’s statute would
provide enforcement authority under section 5,253 so those companies that
fail to follow the FTC’s requirements would be held accountable as they are
today.254
Although Scott’s proposal maximizes consumer protection and notice to
companies, it does not ensure sufficient administrative flexibility. His
proposed statute would require the FTC to issue any legislative rules by
following the procedures set forth in the APA.255 While this process would
evade the added procedural obstacles in place under section 5,256 it would
make any promulgated final rules difficult to amend and adjust in light of
changing technology. Moreover, actually getting any proposed rules
through the notice-and-comment period required under the APA would be
quite expensive for the FTC in terms of time and money. Given these
onerous obstacles, this proposal would make it rather difficult for the FTC
to give companies like Wyndham robust notice of its data security
requirements.

248. See supra Part III.A.2.
249. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II.B (explaining how the FTC brings its unfairness authority to bear
upon companies that suffer data security breaches).
255. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (outlining the procedural requirements
under section 5).
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3. The Administrative Fix
In contrast to Professor Scott, Stegmaier and Bartnick argue that the FTC
should use its administrative authority under section 5 to provide better
notice of its minimum data security requirements.257 This Note contends
that, to the extent that the proposal would require that the FTC engage in
legislative rulemaking, it likely would not provide for adequate
administrative flexibility.
Stegmaier and Bartnick’s proposal would afford regulated companies
improved notice as against the FTC’s current practice.258 They maintain
that the FTC should, preferably, engage in legislative rulemaking to set out
However, they also note that
its data security requirements.259
nonlegislative rulemaking (e.g., issuing policy statements or interpretive
rules) would be better than nothing.260 In either case, any promulgated rule
would have the benefit of providing notice to companies as to which data
security practices the FTC considers “unfair.”261
Additionally, Stegmaier and Bartnick’s proposal would lead to
significantly improved consumer protection. Ex ante, their proposal would
provide guidance to companies via promulgated rules.262 In turn, these
companies could employ data security best practices to ensure the data
security breaches are less likely to occur.263 Ex post, section 5 enforcement
would remain in place to enable the FTC to hold companies who failed to
implement required data security practices accountable.264
Despite these benefits, Stegmaier and Bartnick’s proposal may not
provide the FTC with adequate administrative flexibility. The authors
explicitly prefer legislative rulemaking, as that process would provide
additional notice to companies via notice and comment and the required
informal hearing procedure.265 However, putting aside difficulties in
getting any proposed rule through the hearing and notice-and-comment
procedures,266 such a process would make it rather difficult to amend any
rule regarding data security practices. Such flexibility is invaluable in light
of the dynamic technological environment in which data security
enforcement takes place.267 Indeed, under this proposal, the FTC would
have to adopt a new legislative rule every time it needed to adjust its data

257. See supra Part III.A.3.
258. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the FTC brings its unfairness authority to bear
upon companies that suffer data security breaches).
265. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 710 (“[Legislative] [r]ulemaking likely is
the best method for providing authoritative, detailed guidance so that entities know how to
comply with the law.”).
266. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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security requirements to give appropriate ex ante guidance to companies
such as Wyndham. This would be a significant burden for the FTC.
4. A Proposal for a New Privacy Framework
Lastly, this Note addresses Serwin’s proposal for a new privacy
framework in which the FTC would administer a regime based upon
proportionality that provides a safe harbor from enforcement for compliant
companies.268 Although this approach would likely do the most to
maximize consumer protection and notice to companies, it may not ensure
sufficient administrative flexibility.
Like the legislative and administrative approaches,269 Serwin’s proposal
would provide improved notice to companies. Be it via legislation or
rulemaking, this proposal would ensure that regulated companies know the
FTC’s data security requirements.270 Moreover, Serwin’s four-tiered
approach has the added benefit of providing nuanced guidance as to how
companies can protect consumer information based on its relative
sensitivity.271
This improved notice would serve to promote consumer protection as
well. First, Serwin’s proposal incentivizes companies to adopt data security
best practices as outlined by the FTC because, in so doing, they avoid
liability under section 5.272 Thus, from an ex ante perspective, companies
would be better able to prevent data security breaches from occurring.273
Furthermore, this proposal enables the FTC to engage in ex post
enforcement by bringing actions against those companies that fail to adopt
data security best practices.274
With respect to administrative flexibility, however, Serwin’s proposal
would seem to come up short. In his article, Serwin expresses ambivalence
about implementing his proposal via legislation or rulemaking.275 Either
process, however, could undercut flexibility. Rulemaking would place
procedural obstacles before the FTC because any amendments to rules
promulgated under Serwin’s proposal would need to go through notice and
comment and section 5’s onerous procedural requirements.276 Moreover,
any legislation would prove to be exceedingly inflexible because the FTC
would need to rely on Congress to amend a statute to provide it with the
flexibility to address new and evolving data security threats.
Serwin argues that his approach is flexible because it would enable the
FTC to move a given type of consumer information to a different tier in his

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra Part III.A.4.
See supra Part III.A.2–3.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
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four-tiered framework.277 While this may well be true, Serwin seems to
ignore the fact that implementation via legislation or rulemaking would
require any changes to be implemented via the same onerous processes.
Thus, as is the case with the other proposals, the FTC could not provide
companies like Wyndham with adequate notice of its data security
requirements without dealing with significant procedural hurdles.
IV. TOWARD A REASONABLE REGIME:
A NEW PROPOSAL REGARDING THE FTC’S CURRENT APPLICATION
OF ITS UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY IN THE DATA SECURITY CONTEXT
As Part III.B demonstrates, current proposals regarding the FTC’s use of
its unfairness authority in the data security context fail to maximize
consumer protection, administrative flexibility, and notice to regulated
companies. Accordingly, in an effort to maximize each of these important
societal interests, Part IV.A of this Note proposes a new solution to the lack
of clarity in the FTC’s data security jurisprudence and discusses its benefits
and an identified drawback. Then, Part IV.B considers a potential
drawback to this Note’s novel proposal.
A. A New Proposal Incorporating the Principle of Proportionality
In terms of implementation, the FTC should issue the following proposal
by means of nonlegislative rulemaking.278 As outlined above, this form of
rulemaking could take the form of an interpretive rule or a policy
statement.279 An interpretive rule could outline how the FTC interprets
section 5 with respect to unfair data security practices.280 Alternatively, a
policy statement could notify regulated companies and the public generally
of the manner in which the FTC will exercise its unfairness authority in the
data security context moving forward.281
Delineating the exact data security practices that the FTC should outline
in any nonlegislative rulemaking is beyond the scope of this Note.
However, Solove and Hartzog’s article seems to provide a sufficient
starting point. Upon analyzing “the FTC’s data security jurisprudence,” the
authors compiled a list of what they term “inadequate security practices.”282
For instance, Solove and Hartzog note that, in publically available
complaints and consent orders, the FTC appears to deem such things as
“[l]ack of encryption,” “[f]ail[ing] to test the security of a . . . process,”
“[f]ail[ing] to remedy known security vulnerabilities,” “[f]ail[ing] to
implement . . . common industry security practices,” and “[the use of]
[p]oor username/password protocol” to be unfair data security practices per
se.283 Accordingly, the FTC should draw from Solove and Hartzog’s work
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 651.
Id. at 650–55.
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and look to its own complaints and consent orders284 to determine which
data security practices it considers “unfair.”
The FTC should not stop there. As Serwin’s article indicates, not all
consumer information should be subject to the same data security
requirements.285 Some companies possess rather sensitive personal
information (e.g., Social Security numbers and fingerprint data), while
others have more mundane information (e.g., usernames and email
addresses). Thus, any nonlegislative rulemaking should incorporate the
principle of “proportionality.”286 Drawing from Serwin, the FTC should
determine where a given type of consumer information falls on the
spectrum between “nonsensitive” and “highly sensitive.”287 For example,
the FTC could itemize types of consumer data under categories, such as
Schedules I through IV, where Schedule I includes the least sensitive
consumer information, while Schedules II, III, and IV include increasingly
more sensitive information. The FTC then could ratchet up the minimum
data security requirements for those companies with more sensitive
consumer information.288 To be most effective, any nonlegislative
rulemaking should also lay out what minimum data security practices
correspond with each schedule (i.e., “tier”) of consumer information.289
Under such a regime, companies will know, based on the types of consumer
information that they retain, which data security practices they ought to
have in place.
Lastly, as Serwin has proposed, the FTC should include a safe harbor
provision in its nonlegislative rulemaking promulgated pursuant to this
Note’s proposal.290 Such a provision would state explicitly that any
company that complies with the data security requirements as laid out in the
interpretive rule or policy statement would be deemed to have acted “fairly”
for the purposes of section 5.291 Accordingly, a regulated company would
know, ex ante, whether its data security practices are in compliance with
section 5.292
This Note’s proposal would serve to maximize notice to companies,
consumer protection, and administrative flexibility. First, it would improve
notice to companies. By outlining, as specifically as possible, which data
security requirements correspond with specific types of consumer
information,293 a company would know what the FTC requires of it in terms
284. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
291. In the context of corporate compliance, there is a similar regime wherein the U.S.
Sentencing Commission has required that companies have “an effective compliance and
ethics program” in place to prevent criminal conduct and forestall prosecution. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
292. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 287–89 (describing a proportionality-based data
security regime).
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of data security. While nonlegislative rulemaking would not provide
companies with the same notice and opportunity to be heard that a noticeand-comment procedure would afford,294 the FTC can and should solicit
industry input when promulgating nonlegislative rulemaking under this
Note’s proposal.295
Next, this proposal would maximize the FTC’s overarching goal of
robust consumer protection. From an ex ante perspective, improved notice
via nonlegislative rules would better enable companies to protect consumers
before a data security breach occurs by helping them to prevent breaches in
the first instance.296 Moreover, this proposal affords the added benefit of
providing nuanced guidance to companies based on the relative sensitivity
of the consumer information that they retain.297 Ex post, the FTC could
continue to bring enforcement actions under section 5 against companies
that fail to meet the FTC’s minimum data security requirements298 because
such companies could not take advantage of the proposal’s safe harbor
provision.299
Finally, this Note’s proposal, as against the proposals discussed above,300
would provide the FTC with maximal administrative flexibility. Legislative
rulemaking and congressional legislation involve many procedural
obstacles, and they can be quite expensive in terms of time and money.301
Moreover, promulgating policy through administrative adjudication
provides little guidance ex ante.302 Conversely, nonlegislative rulemaking
would enable the FTC to promulgate policy ex ante, thereby providing
improved guidance to regulated companies.303 Additionally, whenever the
FTC would need to change its data security policy in light of evolving
technology, it would have the ability to amend any existing data security
policy by issuing a new interpretive rule or policy statement.304
In sum, the proposal outlined in this Note, which encourages the FTC to
outline minimum data security requirements that reflect the principle of
294. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of legislative
rulemaking).
295. Indeed, the FTC hosted a “PrivacyCon” in early 2016 where the FTC, along with
stakeholders such as industry insiders, “discuss[ed] the latest research and trends related to
consumer privacy and data security.” See PrivacyCon, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/01/privacycon (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/5WQQ-PKFK]. Such events provide the FTC with an ideal opportunity to
engage with industry insiders in an effort to garner input regarding data security best
practices.
296. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See supra Part III.B.2–4 (discussing the shortcomings attendant to congressional
legislation and legislative rulemaking).
302. See supra Part III.B.1 (criticizing the FTC’s current ad hoc approach).
303. See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
304. Cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (holding that
agencies need not engage in legislative rulemaking to issue a new interpretation of a
regulation that was originally interpreted via nonlegislative rulemaking).
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proportionality via nonlegislative rulemaking,305 would maximize the
FTC’s interests in providing robust consumer protection while retaining
administrative flexibility.306 In addition, the proposal goes further by
ensuring that regulated companies receive ex ante guidance as to the FTC’s
minimum data security requirements.307
B. Possible Concerns Regarding Judicial Deference
In closing, Part IV.B of this Note considers one potential drawback to the
novel proposal laid out in Part IV.A: the possibility of decreased judicial
deference. Absent a congressional mandate to the contrary, courts typically
give significant deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it
administers.308 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has added the caveat that
an agency interpretation is only entitled to significant deference “when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”309
Consequently, the nonlegislative rulemaking that this Note proposes likely
would receive considerably less judicial deference as against legislative
rulemaking.
Notably, decreased judicial deference could put the FTC at a
disadvantage if the application of its unfairness authority pursuant to this
Note’s proposal were challenged in court. However, the Supreme Court has
also held that, given the experience and expertise of agencies like the FTC,
even nonlegislative rules can garner at least some judicial deference.310
Moreover, a reduction in judicial deference does not suggest that a given
agency action is any less lawful. Thus, notwithstanding any reduced
judicial deference, the FTC should not hesitate to adopt the proposal set
forth in Part IV.A of this Note.
CONCLUSION
In an age where companies increasingly acquire and retain private
consumer information, data security breaches are a constant threat. These
breaches compromise personal information which consumers would prefer
to keep private and can lead to identity theft. To combat this trend, the FTC
has stepped in to prevent data security breaches by holding victimized
companies accountable when their data security practices are considered
inadequate. Specifically, the FTC increasingly has relied on its unfairness
authority under section 5 of the FTC Act to bring enforcement actions
against those companies that have not implemented “reasonable” data

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra notes 278–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
See id. at 234.
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security procedures. The FTC has not, however, provided specific guidance
regarding which practices it deems “unreasonable.”
Although legal scholars have offered various solutions to address this
lack of guidance, this Note argues that they fall short. Thus, this Note
proposes a new approach. Rather than relying upon administrative
adjudication, legislation, or legislative rulemaking, the FTC should engage
in nonlegislative rulemaking to inform companies of its minimum data
security requirements under section 5. Such rulemaking, whether in the
form of an interpretive rule or policy statement, should lay out mandatory
data security practices that are proportional to the consumer information
that a given company retains. Furthermore, any interpretive rule or policy
statement should include a safe harbor provision to ensure compliant
companies that their data security practices will not be deemed “unfair.”
FTC implementation of this Note’s proposal would ensure that: (1)
companies are put on notice regarding the FTC’s minimum data security
requirements; (2) the FTC can continue to pursue its goal of robust
consumer protection; and (3) the FTC will have maximum administrative
flexibility in light of the ever-evolving technological environment that it
regulates.

